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conflict and jealousy were almost inevitable. A general like d'Estrées would not brook the open contempt of an accomplished seaman like Duquesne, and Duquesne being only second in command was not too ready to repair the mistakes of his inexperienced chief. The idea that the French were purposely held back may well have arisen from a general direction that appears to have been given to captains not to engage too precipitately. It was probably the outcome of a piece of advice which M. de la Roncière tells us Charles II. gave when he visited the French fleet at Spithead. Praising the vigor and courage of his allies he warned them that too much ardor may upset the order that is essential in naval actions, and particularly the French predilection for boarding. "It is wrong", he said "to attempt boarding till the enemy is in thorough disorder and even then instead of being content with three or four prizes, the object must be the complete destruction of the enemy's fleet." Strange as it may seem there was a strong touch of Nelson in the Merry Monarch, and if the French showed a marked respect for his opinion it is no wonder.

The mystery of Solebay is but one of the many points on which M. de la Roncière throws fresh light, but it serves well to show how much the richer we are for his long and unremitting labor. Nor is it only on naval operations that his work has value. There is also a section on Colbert's administration which gives in detail a comprehensive account of everything that went to establish France as a first-class naval power and another on the collateral activities of the *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*. The volume concludes with the effort made in the years 1680-1683 to curb the Barbary pirates and so rounds off an imperfectly known chapter in history with a fullness of matter which must long remain indispensable for the special period and even beyond the special subject.

JULIAN S. CORBETT.

The Empire at War. Edited by Sir CHARLES LUCAS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. [For the Royal Colonial Institute.] Volume I. (Oxford: University Press. 1921. Pp. xi, 324. 15 s.)

WHILE the World War was in progress the Royal Colonial Institute planned a comprehensive historical work on the subject of British imperial defense, the purpose being "to trace the growth of Imperial co-operation in war time prior to the late War, to give side by side a complete record of the effort made in the late War by every unit of the Overseas Empire from the greatest to the smallest, and also to tell in what particular ways and to what extent the fortunes and the development of each part were affected by the War". When complete it is to consist of five volumes, of which the first, by the general editor, Sir Charles Lucas, has now appeared. The period surveyed in this introductory volume extends from 1655, when troops recruited in the English

West Indies participated in the conquest of Jamaica, to the great uprising throughout the empire in the August days of 1914. The author's principal object is to show how the colonies and dependencies have co-operated in the military and naval defense of the empire. His qualifications for the task need not be enlarged upon here.

Military co-operation came first in point of time. The withdrawal of the British garrisons from the self-governing colonies, which took place during the sixties and seventies of the last century, threw upon those colonies the responsibility for their own military defense, and contributed to the development among them of a new sense of imperial partnership. "I have not the smallest doubt", said Gladstone in 1861, "that in the proportion that responsibilities are accepted by communities, they will be more disposed to go beyond the bare-idea of self-defence, and to render loyal and effective assistance in the struggles of the Empire," and abundantly have events justified his confidence. When in 1885, following the tragedy of Gordon at Khartoum, New South Wales, of its own free will and at its own expense, sent a military contingent to the Sudan, the greater efforts made by the dominions in the South African War and in the World War were forecast. In addition to giving a careful description of the development of defense forces in all the self-governing colonies, the author devotes several chapters to the Indian army and its activities. Here, however, he is not dealing with voluntary co-operation, as in the case of the self-governing colonies, for, as he says, "Imperial co-operation in the dependent half of the Empire was a matter of dictation by the central authority." He is not concerned to draw the line between defense and offense—perhaps it cannot be drawn sharply—but the Indian army has proved a most effective instrument for carrying on operations that can scarcely be called defensive. "Only in the light of the late war", writes Sir Charles, "have we realized the hideous possibilities which would assuredly emerge from a Germanized Asia or Africa—countless legions of coloured janissaries, trained and organized to follow leaders as ruthless as they are resolute, and to impose the will of their masters upon a terrorized world." No one who agrees with him as to the general beneficence of British imperial rule would stigmatize as "janissaries" the Indian mercenaries who have been such a potent factor in extending that rule, but unfriendly critics of British imperialism might do so. It is all a question of the point of view.

In naval as in military defense the same principle of co-operation is to be observed. Responsibility for naval self-defense was not thrust upon the self-governing colonies by any action of the mother country, but was voluntarily assumed by them, in greater or less degree, and by 1902 all of them, except Canada, which under the Laurier régime was following a policy of "friendly isolation", were contributing in one form or another, each as it saw fit. Before 1914 Australian nationality had

expressed itself in the creation of a dominion navy, entirely under Australian control in time of peace but to act as a part of the greater imperial navy in time of war. The history of the dominion defense forces, military and naval, as the author relates it, throws much light upon the constitutional character of the British commonwealth of nations.

ROBERT LIVINGSTON SCHUYLER.

British History in the Nineteenth Century (1782-1901). By GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Company. 1922. Pp. xvi, 445. 12 s. 6 d.)

"THE philosophy of Dr. Johnson's England was static, not evolutionary: the world was not expected to change. Civilisation, it was thought, had 'arrived', after a number of barbarous ages, and was going to stay comfortably where it was." The idea of "progress" did not occupy, much less haunt, the mind of Dr. Johnson and his contemporaries. Britain was a self-satisfied and reasonably happy island. Life was largely rural, simple, and essentially medieval in its methods of production. A capable aristocracy shouldered the high obligations of nobility; the lower orders accepted without question the stations to which Providence had assigned them. If there was much physical and moral degradation in the darker corners of the land, it was off the accustomed highways of those who dwelt in the sun, and, besides, as none conceived of progress, all accepted wretchedness as a matter of course.

Such was the complacent island now rudely shocked by the unthinkable and unholy ideas and processes of the French Revolution and undermined with the irresistibility of fate by the unseen forces of the Industrial Revolution. Out of this situation sprang the conflicting elements that gave distinctive character to British history in the nineteenth century. The spirit of Old England was the spirit of immobility; the spirit of nineteenth-century England was the spirit of change. The profound economic and social changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution made it difficult for the civilization of Dr. Johnson's England "to stay comfortably where it was". A "matchless constitution" no longer sufficed. This newly created problem of readjustment would have been comparatively simple if the Industrial Revolution could have run its course and congealed, but its processes were continuous and progressive throughout the century. The problem was, therefore, one of successive adjustments to keep pace with a society changing with a rapidity unparalleled in history. In a succession of crises it was British political sagacity that preserved England from the experiences of the Continent and permitted the triumphant forward march of the English constitution.

This, in essence, is Mr. Trevelyan's conception of the meaning of nineteenth-century British history. It emphasizes the vital relation of economic and social factors to political history, political history being the